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 In discussions about genetics and ethics, a nexus of material is encountered 
which refers to a central component, the genetic material, DNA. Some discussions 
touch on DNA only tangentially; for instance, discussions on prenatal diagnosis of 
disease and its consequences are often more about reproductive medicine than 
genetics or DNA. But there are three quite distinct and recent developments which 
concern DNA itself. They are the development of DNA fingerprinting, the 
development of medical and DNA information banks such as the DeCode project in 
Iceland, and DNA sequencing initiatives such as the Human Genome Project. I am 
grateful to Catherine Cowley for raising some issues in relation to these 
developments,1 which I will try to address in this paper.  
 
 One really significant problem, often overlooked by commentators, is that 
these developments involve using different physical techniques for treating DNA. 
This results in qualitatively different kinds of information and provokes different 
ethical questions as a consequence. These differences in laboratory techniques, and 
the information on DNA that they give, do not seem to have been taken into account 
in recent discussion on the ethical problems raised by DNA technology. In order to 
enter into an informed evaluation of some of the ethical debate in this area, it is 
necessary to consider the technical issues in more detail. 
 
1. Three main approaches to analysing DNA ; fingerprints, single gene 
hybridisation and full sequencing. 
 
 Until about 20 years ago, DNA could only be extracted from relatively large 
amounts of fresh tissue, and then only with some difficulty. Recent developments in 
technology, particularly PCR, the polymerase chain reaction, have allowed the 
successful extraction of DNA from tiny samples, such as a single hair, a smear of 
blood, or a trace of saliva. (There must be some intact cells in the sample, so DNA 
cannot normally be extracted from urine or nail). 
 
 Once the DNA is extracted, it can be examined in a number of ways, each 
yielding a different kind of information. DNA is an enormously long chain molecule, 
with a small number of subunits repeated in complex patterns, often called sequences. 
Some of these specify the structure, or code, for proteins and some do not. All cell 
activity in all living organisms is controlled by proteins specified by DNA; hence it is 
often described in terms such as the 'blueprint of life'. Human DNA consists of a large 
amount of non coding DNA, that is, chemical sequences which do not code for 
proteins or any cellular component, and whose function is thought to be structural. A 
much smaller proportion (less than 5%) of the DNA codes for the proteins and other 
constituents of the body. These coding sequences correspond to what we think of as 
genes (-and it is therefore true that most of our DNA is not actually our genes).  
 
  There are three main approaches to analysing DNA, described as follows. In 
the first approach, the DNA can be simply cut up into fragments of different sizes, 
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and techniques applied to visualise the resulting pattern.2  This pattern of DNA 
fragments of different sizes observed is, to all intents and purposes, unique for each 
individual, and can therefore be used to identify the presence of an individual.  This 
procedure results in the so-called "DNA fingerprint". Further, paternal and maternal 
elements can be identified and it is therefore possible to decide if two individuals are 
related by comparing their DNA fingerprints. (It is also theoretically possible to use 
statistical techniques to try to estimate the probability of an individual belonging to a 
particular group or carrying a certain gene sequence, but these techniques cannot be 
very precise, and never definitive). 
   
 Overall, the DNA fingerprint does not give any direct information as to the 
nature of the genes coded for by the DNA, and it gives no information about the 
chemical sequence of the DNA. It does, however, give direct information about the 
identity of individuals, including their relatedness. It is widely used by the police in 
forensic investigations, where the question of identity alone is at issue.3 This kind of 
information relates to what might be called 'forensic identity', answering the question 
'who has been present' ?  
 
 A second approach is widely used to determine the presence or absence of a 
gene sequence associated with disease. The DNA must be treated differently and must 
be probed with a DNA fragment of the gene or specific coding sequence in question, 
or one known to be closely associated with it. This is the procedure offered for tests in 
hospital for a small range of specific inherited conditions, and in larger research 
projects. A separate probe must be used for each gene sequence sought. This kind of 
individual gene hybridisation shows the presence or absence of a specific gene, and 
can also give information as to individuals' relatedness, as well as to relatives' 
possible risk of disease. The DeCode project in Iceland is an attempt to record all such 
tests in one country, together with complete medical records and DNA samples from 
the whole population, so that continued research can be pursued.4
 
 The third approach allows the complete chemical sequence of all the DNA of 
a particular individual to be obtained. This is a lengthy and expensive process, and has 
so far only been done in research – eg,  the Human Genome Project. However, even 
this is more problematic than it might appear. The coding sequences of DNA which 
we call genes are recognisably different from each other. For many of these coding 
sequences, there is one commonly found sequence and several minor variants which 
nevertheless lead to normal function of the individuals possessing them. About a third 
of all genes show such variation. And therefore, if the DNA from two different 
humans is examined, the coding sequences will diverge where one or other person has 
one of these minor variants. About ten percent of the total coding sequence will be 
                                                 
2 This is done by "probing" or hybridising the DNA under test with DNA of a specified type. Under 
appropriate conditions, this probe DNA will bind to any part of the test DNA with the same sequence.  
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4 It seems that the UK Biobank, which was promoted initially as a similar DNA based project, has 
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different in such a comparison. In addition, there are a much smaller number of  
sequence variants that are actually associated with inherited disease. There is 
therefore no such thing as the definitive human genome; since all individuals will 
have a sequence unique to them. The 'Human Genome' actually refers to the range of 
possible satellite sequences that are variably repeated, and the range of possible 
coding sequences in healthy individuals, and is dependant on the samples of such 
individuals that have so far been sequenced completely.  
 
 In the case of these latter two kinds of DNA information, the information 
given is not about forensic identity, but instead, about personal biochemistry and risk 
of disease, which extends to relatives. This is a kind of 'risk identity', asking the 
question 'what might happen?' and giving information about the probabilities that an 
individual has or will develop certain biochemical states and related conditions or 
illnesses. 
 
 All three  kinds of  DNA analysis give primary results which can appear as 
photographs of gels or radiographs, which can be stored, or, more recently, as 
computer images. Computers are essential for any large scale comparison or analysis 
of results and their interpretations.5  The extracted DNA can also be stored, and is a 
fairly stable compound. Blood and tissue samples can be stored, but are less stable 
than the purified DNA itself. 
 
 The current applications of these techniques centre on forensic science, 
medical research and industrial development. In the forensic field, police forces all 
over the world have taken up the use of genetic fingerprinting. In the UK the police 
have the right to collect and use, from anyone suspected of a crime or merely present 
at a crime scene, body tissue, DNA and information on identity extracted from it. 
While many DNA samples taken are for the purpose of elimination, nevertheless, 
whether or not the suspect proves to be implicated in any way, the police may store 
this information on identity on a database and use it in relation to any other crime.  In 
the area of medical and industrial development, both publicly funded research groups 
and pharmaceutical companies have established several major databases of partial 
DNA sequences from large cohorts of related people, in order to advance research 
into both inherited diseases and normal gene function, and to develop profitable 
techniques applicable to inherited disease. There are also several databases of 
complete human DNA sequences.  
 
 The consequence of all this is that from one person, traces of bodily material 
that might formerly have been considered in the category of waste products, can now 
yield a storable and analysable chemical, which can give a range of information. This 
can be about forensic identity, or about risk, such as genetic predisposition to disease, 
or other inherited features such as blood groups, and this information can affect others 
besides the individual from whom the sample came. The information can be 
processed by computer, allowing instant retrieval from globally distributed locations. 
It should perhaps be noted that there are some things the new information does not do; 
for instance, the knowledge of the complete sequence of the human genome does not 
allow scientists straightaway to identify every gene, the protein it produces and the 
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computers is having a determining effect on public policy making on genetic information issues. 
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function of that protein. Alas, the project was initially oversold in this respect; the vast 
majority of sequences are still of unknown function. Similarly, although the cure of 
disease is one of the ultimate goals of this project, I am not aware of a single cure for 
disease that has yet been found as a result of the new information. With this caution in 
mind, we may think of a number of new legal and ethical questions which arise from  
these new kinds of DNA based information. 
 
Some of these questions focus on the individual. For instance, who, if anyone, owns - 
the primary body tissue ? -- the DNA extracted from it? -- the information as to 
identity obtainable from that DNA? -- the information as to potential health obtainable 
from that DNA? -- any other information obtainable from that DNA?  Who can give 
or withhold consent to DNA, or information, being extracted? Some other questions 
concern the wider community. Who is entitled to know, or not to know, information 
about identity or risks to health ? Who is entitled to use, and for what purposes, any or 
all of the above information? ? And whose interests are concerned in such possible 
ownership and use? 6 In the ethical literature there seem to be two poles of ethical 
thinking applicable to these new situations, which I now discuss. 
 
2.  Human DNA as private property 
 
 One kind of ethical approach to these issues is essentially modern, and 
originates in Locke's defence of the individual's right to extend themselves by 
appropriating to themselves the results of their labour. In this case, the concept of 
ownership is prior to society, which comes into being because of the need to defend 
property. This kind of argument leads to a stress on defending the integrity and 
privacy of the individual, and such arguments seem often to be found in discussions 
of forensic data banks of DNA fingerprints. In a review of ethical issues in genetics, 
Thomas Shannon suggests that  information about an individual's genome is now 
effectively in the public arena, that this information has wide social and economic 
implications, and that in the USA at least, this has implications for the traditional 
concept of privacy.7  Concern about the use of police DNA fingerprint databases for 
inappropriate individuals has also been an issue in Europe. A recent example is the 
case of Benjamin Deceuninck, an environmental campaigner who was arrested in 
France for disturbing genetically manipulated beetroot plants. He declined to give a 
DNA sample for the French national DNA fingerprint database, and his refusal being 
deemed unlawful, he was consequently fined.8 Freedom to campaign politically might 
well be compromised if police forces have access to information on the forensic 
identity of those involved.  In a paper typical of the ethics literature on this subject, 
Judith Wagner DeCew provides a reappropriation of privacy in the context of DNA 
and information in medical databases and projects. She argues that privacy is 
necessary for freedom, independence and the "nurturing of creativity" of the human 
person. She asserts that  
 
                                                 
6 The question of interests, looked at from a sociological point of view, would take up a paper on its 
own. Elsewhere, I have used the theologically grounded analysis of Jacques Ellul to look at the 
question of genetic engineering in relation to the environment, and I think it would be similarly 
revealing applied to the DNA based information under consideration here. (Stewart, 2003) 
7 Shannon, TA, 1999: 123 
8  http://publish.indymedia.org/en/2006/09/847499.shtml  Accessed 8/10/06 
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privacy is a shield protecting us from scrutiny, prejudice, coercion, 
pressure to conform, and the judgement of others.9  
 
She regards genetic information as analogous to medical records, and suggests that 
the computerised storage of records in databases has led to a major threat to privacy. 
 
At every stage of the process of collection and storage, dangers can arise, 
including entry errors, improper access, exploitation, and unauthorised 
use. Secondary use and aggregation of data are all easier, faster, and less 
expensive, and thus pose additional threats to an individual's control over 
the disposition of medical and genetic information.... The rapid and 
sophisticated ways that data can be updated, changed and configured with 
few restrictions on dissemination and use, combine with the difficulties of 
getting rid of data that is obsolete or inaccurate, make privacy concerns 
for medical information appear virtually intractable.10
 
DeCew cites the example of the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center where open 
access to electronic records is the default, and accountability for this is measured after 
the fact, with monitoring . There is, of course, no technical reason why a system 
should not have hierarchical pass words, so that privacy is the default and open access 
has to be elected. DeCew considers statutory attempts at regulation of such databases, 
including European legislation upon which the UK data protection act is based. She 
also considers the process of corporate self-regulation, whereby the proprietors of the 
databases police themselves. She concludes that in the USA, this has been insufficient 
to defend the interest of the patient. She recommends a hybrid system in which 
national legislation requires databases to use procedures which protect the privacy and 
rights of patients as the norm, but which allows negotiated departures from this with 
patients' informed consent.  She acknowledges that this has both the advantages and 
disadvantages attendant on the issues surrounding informed consent. Nevertheless, 
she concludes that this would be the best approach to protect the privacy of medical 
and genetic information on individuals in the USA and she argues that this approach 
guards the value of individual autonomy which is fundamental to her ethics, while 
still allowing new technology to advance.  
  
3. Communal use of DNA information for the 'common good'  
 
 The second ethical approach is derived principally from Aquinas' synthesis of 
Scripture, tradition and classical philosophy. The origins of this kind of argument 
make it potentially compatible with a theological approach, even when it is presented 
in a more secular form. On this view, ownership of property is a right to use, not a 
right of absolute disposal; it is an aid to the right ordering of society, not a constituent 
of humanity. Communal use has priority in cases of need, and a teleology derived 
from natural law applies, so that the ultimate goal is always the flourishing of the 
human community.  Arguments with this foundation, about the necessity for the 
subsidiarity of the individual to the common good, are often found in discussions of  
risk identity derived from DNA data banks used for research into human disease.  
 
                                                 
9  DeCew, 2004:5 
10 DeCew 2004: 6-7 
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 For example, in one of the 'Ethical Eye' series from the Council of Europe, 
Bartha Knoppers argues that the human genome is best seen as a common heritage, 
rather than disputed property.11 She argues that European legislation has so far not 
defined genetic material as either part of the person or property, and that irrespective 
of such classification, legislation does not prevent patenting of certain DNA 
sequences. She was chair of the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) Ethics 
Committee, and cites its statement on benefit sharing, arguing that humans have 
genomic material in common, that global resources have been viewed as common to 
all since Grotius devised a law of the sea on these principles, and that where there is 
an imbalance in power between those providing material for research and those 
profiting from it, benefit sharing is a functional method of resolving potential 
injustice.  She gives examples of such benefit sharing, for example that the state of 
Iceland has negotiated free use for the whole population of any pharmaceuticals 
discovered by using the Icelandic DNA database. She further cites the 1997 UNESCO 
Universal Declaration On The Human Genome And Human Rights, which considers 
the human genome to be "in a symbolic sense the heritage of humanity".  She regrets 
that this has not been more strongly translated into law. She concludes that while 
property law and law relating to the person cannot prevent industrial appropriation of 
genetic information via patenting, the concepts of benefit sharing and common 
heritage can be used to counter any injustice arising from such appropriation. She 
asserts  
 
The time is ripe to move forward beyond the reification or sanctification 
of human DNA. We need to examine and harmonise the conditions of 
consent and control at the level of individuals within countries as well as 
ensuring international surveillance at the level of the common human 
genome........ such discussion will probably have greater impact that the 
current sterile polemic surrounding "ownership".12
 
In a recent paper, Esther Reed pursues similar questions, and in the context of the 
Human Genome Project, explores the work of Grotius, who established the 
foundations of the international law of the sea in the early 17th century. She 
characterises Grotius as 
 
a Janus figure who looks back to a coherently theological vision of the 
relation between natural law, the law of reason, and human law, and 
forward to the unhappy coincidence between subjective rights and 
property interests in the modern period. 13
 
Reed draws a parallel between the status of the sea in the time of Grotius and the 
status of information on the human genome sequence in the present day. Should it be 
accessible by all? What 'rights of necessity' apply where gross inequalities between 
rich and poor appear? What 'use rights' are in the common interest? She argues that 
the nature of genetic information raises ethical questions that cannot be solved simply 
in terms of private property, and her critique converges on that of Onora O'Neill, 
(2004) which I will discuss later on, when she says 
 
                                                 
11 Knoppers, 2004  
12 Knoppers, 2004:115-116 
13 Reed 2006:43 
 7
The interfamilial implications of genetic information and 
transgenerational consequences of decisions about reproduction raise 
questions beyond ethical concerns for individual privacy and autonomy. 
DNA data banking at the level of populations rouses ethical suspicions 
because of claims that it could become the "pseudo-science" of racism 
and exacerbate discrimination. 14
 
Grotius follows on from Aquinas in assuming a form of natural law, but he regards 
human survival as requiring a form of self-love, leading to the acquisition of what is 
necessary for life. The right to property is a permissive right of usage, in keeping with 
such natural law. Furthermore, divine providence causes human beings to live in 
community, and appropriate laws are necessary to promote social harmony. So laws 
recognising common rights and regulating trade are necessary, but Grotius always 
recognises the pre-eminent claim of the common good in marginal or emergency 
situations. 
 
 Reed approves the parallels with Grotius drawn by Knoppers, and notes that 
the 2000 HUGO Ethics Committee Statement referred to above uses the concepts of 
common heritage and benefit sharing, which are more concrete than the earlier 
statement from UNESCO in 1997 on the same theme, where the human genome is 
spoken of as a heritage of humanity in a symbolic sense only. She points out that 
initially access to the human genome sequence was to be public, and that the 1996 
Bermuda Statement on this is in harmony with Grotius' principles of contribution to 
the common good. However, at present no international treaty or agreement actually 
requires this to be made concrete. President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair stated 
that sequences resulting from publicly funded research would be deposited in the 
international GenBank, but they made no legal requirement for any privately funded 
or industrial project to do the same. There was consequent controversy when some 
major private companies refused to make their sequences public. Reed suggests that 
Grotius would have argued for legislation to ensure open access.  
 
 She also recognises that the concept of the common good is capable of abuse, 
particularly where state monopolies exist. But she argues that in contemporary times, 
the state is necessary to balance the power of market forces, and must educate and 
regulate in order to protect the citizen. 
 
 Reed also looks at the application of principles from Grotius to the question of 
the patenting of gene sequences, and comes to the conclusion that he would support 
the contemporary distinction made between a discovery, which describes an existing 
state in nature, and an invention, which goes beyond nature. The former is not 
patentable; the latter is. Consequently, she concludes that human gene sequences as 
such should not be patentable. 
 
4. Problematic aspects of both 'common good' and  'private property' 
approaches  
 
 Neither of these approaches provides a definitive answer to the problems 
raised by the availability of the new DNA derived information. Onora O'Neill (2004) 
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points out some of the problems of the private property approach. In terms of  forensic 
identity, is genetic information more sensitive than the information driving licence or 
in a passport? O'Neill argues that it is not the nature of the information that is 
important, but the use to which it is put. Further, in terms of risk identity, not all 
aspects of genetic information are private. We do not normally hide our hair or eye 
colour, and gender is a social necessity. So some grounds have to be found to make 
distinctions between genetic information that can be public and that which must be 
private.15 Secondly, as I pointed out in the account of kinds of genetic testing, genetic 
information about one person may also be information about a relative. The relative 
must also have some interest in the concealment or disclosure of this information, as it 
may affect their health or welfare. O'Neill argues that the use of individual privacy as 
a principle in ethical discussion is inappropriate in the case of genetic data. A further 
problem she raises is that of timing; a great deal of genetic research is retrospective. 
O'Neill says 
 
It is a fantasy to imagine that prior consent can be given to future research 
projects. Indeed, it is unclear whether any ethically convincing form of 
informed consent to highly complex uses of  DNA information is 
possible. (2004:181).  
 
 
At the time of collection of DNA samples, it is not possible for researchers to predict 
the purposes for which data may be used, because of the rapid advance of techniques 
and possibilities. Consequently, individual consent cannot realistically be given for 
what cannot be specifically foreseen. This has certainly proved to be the case in the 
Iceland database project. 
 
 On the other hand, proponents of the 'common good'  approach do not usually 
deal with the question of 'Big Brother' , the possibility of state abuse of techniques 
such as DNA fingerprinting. Esther Reed, in her development of natural law theory, 
does not ask if the thought of Grotius  can be extended to cover the problems raised 
by the existence of police data banks of DNA fingerprints. In the UK, political 
demonstrators who are not necessarily breaking the law can nevertheless be detained 
by police and samples taken for DNA fingerprints, as happened in the French case 
mentioned earlier. It is perfectly possible for the police to identify the presence of 
political protestors at different sites or events. Should the state have such information, 
which could be used to limit civil protest and action?  Is it the case that natural law 
theory is less able to deal with the potential abuse of authority because of the social 
contexts of those who developed it? For Grotius, the sovereign has a right to demand 
that citizens contribute to the common good, and the citizens cannot repudiate their 
sovereign. It is difficult to see how he could be used to argue for civil right limitations 
to DNA fingerprint data. Other significant questions arise in respect of  data banks 
holding sequence information involving others than the donor. Here some hard 
questions may have to be asked about where the common good is to be found. Can the 
state assume responsibility for saying that if I am predisposed to cancer or 
Huntingdon's disease, my unsuspecting cousin is to be informed? Or is not to be 
informed? Who is to be told if my legal parent can be seen to be not my biological 
parent? These are the classic dilemmas of genetic counselling, and fairly rare, but the 
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use of computerised sequence databanks may make them a much more pressing social 
problem. 
 
 In summary, the view of  DNA and the information it holds as private property 
may protect the individual from state abuse or industrial exploitation, but it does not 
allow for the use of DNA in legitimate police work, and it excludes the interests of 
people such as relatives of individuals with genetic disease. On the other hand, the 
secular forms of arguments that collection of DNA based information is to the 
common good, do not protect individuals from external abuse or exploitation. 
 
5. Additional insights from Christian ethical tradition 
 
There is a large and helpful theological literature on ethics and genetics in general, 
although few authors concentrate specifically on the DNA related issues discussed in 
this paper.16 A number of positive insights have emerged. For instance, from the 
perspective of moral theology, it is clear that attempts to improve human physical 
well being are to be supported. In a useful paper on ethics and genetics, Mahoney 
makes this point when he argues from first principles that theological axis of 
Christianity is its claim of salvation for all in Christ. The healing work of Jesus is a 
significant dimension of his proleptic mission of salvation. Human medical and 
therapeutic activity is a participation in that, or extension of it, and therefore the 
positive impulses behind the development of genetic applications to medicine should 
be recognised.17 The limitations of databases containing sequence data, and therefore 
information on possible health issues, are also anticipated theologically. Any 
collection or usage of such data should not be such as to damage human dignity 18, 
and this provides a wider and more flexible context for ethical discussion than that 
given by legal considerations of  privacy. Further, concepts of sin include structural 
sin, and Mahoney evaluates the problems that may arise out of industry's financial 
gain from genetic and DNA technology 19.  It is likely that more careful regulation of  
DNA sequence databases will be required, as the open-endedness which O'Neill notes 
leads to wider ranging consequences for the individuals involved in their creation, and 
for others coming after. 
 
 However, I think that the most important contribution from moral theology to 
this debate comes from the particular understandings of the common good in 
Christian thinking. Jack Mahoney points out that one consequence of Christian belief 
in creation as planned by God is the limiting or contextualising of what is to be 
considered as the common good.20  It must always be seen in an eschatological 
perspective, so that for example, it may not be distorted by short term political 
expediency. Even more importantly, in theological thinking the common good is not a 
kind of lowest common denominator or policy of the greatest good for greatest 
number. It is not Gemeingut, an optimal Rawlsian distribution; rather it is nearer 
Gemeinwohl, a space of fulfillment. It is a struggle to implement a state of affairs 
                                                 
16  Eg T Peters 1997, T Shannon 1999, M Kaveny 1999, JJ Walter 1999, C Deane Drummond 1997 & 
2003,  J Mahoney 2003, L Sowle Cahill 2005, Gerald  Mannion 2006.  
17 Mahoney, 2003: 742 
18 Mahoney 2003:739 
19 Mahoney 2003:740-741 
20 Mahoney 2003 : 747 
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which allows for the best development and highest good for every individual.21 Lisa 
Sowle Cahill describes the general convergence of theological concepts of common 
good with secular concepts put forward by bioethicists in the context of genetics 
generally, and stresses the significance of solidarity as a principle in contemporary 
theological formulations. 22 It is clear that such theological readings of 'common good' 
require active intervention to improve health and limit criminality, while also 
precluding both state and commercial abuse. 
 
 I conclude that discussion based on concepts of 'individual rights' and 
'common good' can be usefully applied to the different sets of ethical problems arising 
from the application of the new DNA technologies. However, these concepts are not 
sufficient in themselves to deal with all the questions that arise. I find that further 
insights from the Christian tradition help clarify and resolve some of these complex 
issues. Databases of DNA fingerprints, giving information on forensic identity, 
undoubtedly have potential for a variety of community benefits (and not all relate to 
crime; for instance, sadly, the identification of the bodies of victims of disasters). The 
ethical question raised by DNA fingerprinting are largely to do with the possibilities 
of  abuse by the state or its agents. The strong tradition in law of protecting individual 
rights has been appropriately applied to DNA fingerprinting but moral theology 
provides necessary modulation of the ethical debate over their use. Medical and 
commercial databases of DNA sequences, giving information on risk to the individual 
and their relatives, have obvious common benefit, but the ethical questions about this 
kind of information are more often about potential failures in the integrity of medical 
practitioners or exploitation by commercial interests. Again, theological 
considerations support the necessity of regulation to prevent abuse of the individual 
by those with vested interests. 
 
JAS, October 2006. 
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